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Based on a difference-in-differences approach, we ﬁnd strong evidence that the initial enforcement
of insider trading laws improves capital allocation efﬁciency. The effect is concentrated in devel-
opedmarkets andmanifests shortly after the enforcement year. Further analysis shows that the im-
provement is positively associated with the increase in liquidity around the enforcement year and
the opaqueness of the information environment before the enforcement year. The improvement is
more pronounced for ﬁrms operating in more competitive markets, being more ﬁnancially
constrained, and with more severe agency problems. Finally, we ﬁnd increased accounting perfor-
mance after the enforcement and the increase is positively associated with the improvement in
capital allocation efﬁciency. Overall, our evidence suggests that the initial enforcement of insider
trading laws improves capital allocation efﬁciency by providing more information to guide mana-
gerial decisions and by reducing market frictions arising from information asymmetry and agency
problems.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A large body of international literature has shown that capital resources are allocatedmore efﬁciently in countries withmore devel-
oped ﬁnancial markets, stronger legal protection of investors, and more transparent informational environments.1 While these cross-
country analyses offer valuable insights, they are also limited in the potential to draw causal inferences (Bushman and Smith, 2001).
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One way to improve these analyses is to examine within-country changes in capital allocation efﬁciency over time using experimental
settings (Wurgler, 2000; Leuz andWysocki, 2016). In this study, we contribute to the literature by testing whether and how the initial
enforcement of insider trading laws (hereafter enforcement) affects capital allocation efﬁciency using a difference-in-differences (DID)
design.
We hypothesize that enforcement improves capital allocation efﬁciency by enhancingmarket efﬁciency. Restriction on insider trad-
ing reduces information asymmetry and enhances liquidity, which in turn attractsmore informed risk arbitrage and improves the infor-
mation efﬁciency of prices (Bushman et al., 2005; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009). More efﬁcient prices improve capital allocation
efﬁciency through at least three channels: (1) by providing more precise information to guide managers' decisions, (2) by reducing ﬁ-
nancing constraints, and (3) by increasing the effectiveness ofmonitoring (Wurgler, 2000; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Bond et al., 2012).
We test our hypothesis on a sample of 123,343 ﬁrm-year observations (17,924 ﬁrms) in 23 developed markets and 19,923 obser-
vations (4264 ﬁrms) in 22 emergingmarkets between 1982 and 2003. FollowingWurgler (2000) and Bushman et al. (2011), wemea-
sure capital allocation efﬁciency by the sensitivity of capital investment growth to investment opportunity shocks. We measure
investment opportunity shocks by the lagged industry returns of US-listed ﬁrms. This design choice builds on the assumption that
there exist common global industry-speciﬁc shocks to growth opportunities (Fisman and Love, 2004). In addition, since the USmarket
is themost efﬁcient, the industry returns of the US-listed ﬁrms are likely the bestmeasure of such common shocks (Rajan and Zingales,
1998; Fisman and Love, 2007).
We ﬁnd strong evidence that ﬁrms allocate capital more efﬁciently after enforcement. In particular, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant
increase in the sensitivity of investment growth to return following enforcement, after controlling for country and year ﬁxed effects on
the sensitivity. The increase is also economically signiﬁcant. Based on the estimate from our baselinemodel, the investment growth as-
sociated with a one-standard-deviation increase in shocks to investment opportunities is about 6% higher in the post-enforcement pe-
riod than in the pre-enforcement period.
Christensen et al. (2016) argue that the effect of regulations could either be weaker or stronger in countries with weaker pre-reg-
ulation institutions. Prior studies have also documented mixed ﬁndings of the enforcement effect in developed and emerging markets
(Bushman et al., 2005; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009). Thus, we examine the effect of enforcement in developed and emergingmarkets
separately. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in capital allocation efﬁciency after enforcement only in the developedmarkets. One possible
reason is that new regulations are more likely to be abused in countries with weak institutions and inefﬁcient bureaucracies (Shleifer,
2005). In addition, emerging markets have poor protection of private property rights, which deters informed risk arbitrage. Therefore
curbing insider tradingmay not increase price informativeness in emergingmarkets (Morck et al., 2000; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009).
Moreover,mechanisms that seek to restrictmanagers' rent-seeking behavior and reduce the cost of externalﬁnancingmayhave limited
beneﬁts when private property rights are weakly protected (Stulz, 2005; Durnev et al., 2009).
We conduct two robustness tests for our identiﬁcation strategy. First,we examine the change in the sensitivity of investment growth
to return in the developedmarkets over a relatively short period of time around the enforcement year (i.e., years−2 to+3,where year
0 is the enforcement year). We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in sensitivity in years +1 to +3 from that in years−2 to 0. Second, we ran-
domly assign a pseudo enforcement year to ﬁrms in countries that began enforcing their insider trading laws before our sample period
or in countries that did not enforce their insider trading laws until after our sample period. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in the sensi-
tivity of investment growth to return after the true enforcement year but not after the pseudo enforcement year.
We ﬁnd that our baseline results are robust to various model speciﬁcations, sample selections, and measurements of investment
growth and investment opportunity shocks. The results are also qualitatively similar when we conduct analysis at the country-year
level by using the country-year-speciﬁc estimates of the sensitivity of investment growth to return as the dependent variable.
We then examine the cross-sectional variation in the effect of enforcement on capital allocation efﬁciency in the developedmarkets
to further substantiate our hypothesis and highlight the potential channels throughwhich enforcementworks. First, if enforcement im-
proves capital allocation efﬁciency by enhancing the informativeness of stock prices, the increase in capital allocation efﬁciency and the
increase in price informativeness should be positively correlated. Prior studies have suggested that curbing insider trading improves
liquidity and higher liquidity attracts more informed trading, which results in more informative prices (Bhattacharya and Spiegel,
1991; Chordia et al., 2008). We measure price informativeness enhancement by the increase in liquidity around the enforcement
year. We ﬁnd that the increase in capital allocation efﬁciency is positively associated with the increase in liquidity.
Second, as insiders trademore aggressively inmore opaque information environments (Aboody et al., 2005), curbing insider trading
should improve price efﬁciency to a greater extent in countries with more opaque information environments before the enforcement
year. We follow Leuz et al. (2003) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) to measure information opacity in each country before the enforce-
ment year. Consistent with our prediction, the improvement in capital allocation efﬁciency is more pronounced in countries where in-
formation environments are more opaque before the enforcement year.
Third, while managers have a great deal of internal information (such as technology, production costs, and strategies), outside in-
vestors are more likely to have external information (such as the status of the industry and competitors) that managers may not
know (Bond et al., 2012). In more competitive industries, the external information would be more useful because ﬁrms are more vul-
nerable to changes in their peers' fortunes and strategies (Ozoguz and Rebello, 2013). Therefore, to the extent that enforcement im-
proves capital allocation efﬁciency by providing more information to guide managers' decisions, the effect is expected to be more
pronounced for ﬁrms that operate in more competitive product markets. Consistent with this prediction, we ﬁnd a more pronounced
effect of enforcement on the sensitivity of investment growth to return in industries with a lower Herﬁndahl index.
Fourth, to the extent that enforcement improves capital allocation efﬁciency by relaxing external ﬁnancing constraints and reducing
agency problems, the effect should be more pronounced for more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms and for ﬁrms with more severe agency
conﬂicts between insiders and outside shareholders. Consistent with this prediction, we ﬁnd a more pronounced increase in capital
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allocation efﬁciency for ﬁrmswith greater ﬁnancial constraints asmeasured by theWhited andWu (2006) index. The effect of enforce-
ment is alsomore pronounced for ﬁrmswithmore severe agency problems, as reﬂected in a positivewedge between the control rights
and cashﬂow rights of the largest shareholder (Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Overall, our evidence provides strong sup-
port for the hypothesis that enforcement improves capital allocation efﬁciency by providing more information to guide managers' de-
cisions, by relaxing ﬁnancing constraints, and by mitigating moral hazard problems.
Finally, we examine the change in accounting performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA), after enforcement. If enforce-
ment improves capital allocation efﬁciency, we should observe an improvement in ex-post accounting performance. Based on a DID
analysis, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in ROA after enforcement. In addition, the increase in ROA is positively associated with the im-
provement in capital allocation efﬁciency after enforcement.
Our study makes several contributions. First, to our best knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst empirical study on the effect of insider
trading regulations on real investment. There is a long-standing analytical debate on how insider trading regulations affect real invest-
ment.2 However,most empirical studies have focused on theﬁnancialmarkets (e.g., Bhattacharya andDaouk, 2002), contracting (Denis
and Xu, 2013), and the information side of the economy (e.g., Bushman et al., 2005; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009; Jayaraman, 2012).
Hail et al. (2014) examine the effect of enforcement on dividend payouts, but they do not examine investment decisions. This study
contributes to the literature by empirically examining the effect of insider trading regulations on capital allocation decisions.
Second, we contribute to the empirical studies on how the legal, institutional, and regulatory environments at the country level af-
fect real investment. Prior studies have examined the effects of legal protection (Wurgler, 2000; Kusnadi andWei, 2017; McLean et al.,
2012) and ﬁnancial development (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Wurgler, 2000; Fisman and Love, 2004). Whereas these studies make
cross-country comparisons, we investigate the change in capital allocation efﬁciency after an exogenous shock to insider trading regu-
lations and provide causal inferences. Insider trading regulations are among the most important controls placed on security markets
and an important element shaping corporate transparency (Bushman et al., 2004). Thus, our study is also linked to prior country-
level studies on the effect of corporate transparency on capital allocation decisions (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Francis et al., 2009;
Bushman et al., 2011).
Third, our paper is also linked to recent studies on securities regulation and enforcement of securities laws (Leuz and Wysocki,
2016). By testing the effect of insider trading laws on real investment decisions, we respond to the call for research on the real effect
of regulations using regulatory shifts as an experimental setting (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). We also conduct cross-sectional analyses
to highlight the important mechanisms through which insider trading regulations affect real corporate decisions.
Finally, our study is related to recent research on the real effect of ﬁnancial markets and information environments in general (Dow
and Gorton, 1997; Chen et al., 2007; Bond et al., 2012). This line of research argues that ﬁnancial markets affect how real corporate de-
cisions are made by changing the information available to decision-makers as well as shaping their incentives (Bond et al., 2012). Two
recent studies examine the change in investment efﬁciency after cross-listing in the US (Foucault and Frésard, 2012) and after adopting
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Loureiro and Taboada, 2015).We contribute to this literature by using the initial
enforcement of insider trading laws as an exogenous shock to price efﬁciency. Furthermore, our cross-sectional results highlight the
channels through which ﬁnancial markets affect real corporate decisions.
An independent and closely-related paper by Edmans et al. (2017) also studies how enforcement changes the sensitivity of invest-
ment to prices after controlling for total price efﬁciency. Their purpose is to isolate the effect ofmanagerial learning from the price of his
own ﬁrm (Bond et al., 2012). Our paper differs from theirs in that we examine the effect of total price efﬁciency on resource allocation.
As recognized in Edmans et al. (2017), enforcement affects resource allocation through multiple channels. For instance, enforcement
may improve price efﬁciency of peer ﬁrms and enhance managerial learning from their peer ﬁrms (Foucault and Frésard, 2014). En-
forcement may also reduce market frictions due to information asymmetry and moral hazard (Dow and Gorton, 1997; Bond et al.,
2012). These effects do not necessarily hinges on the ability of a manager to learn from the prices of his own ﬁrm. We show that the
effect of enforcement on resource allocation efﬁciency is more pronounced for ﬁrms that operate in more competitive industries in
which the beneﬁt of learning from peer ﬁrms is greater (Ozoguz and Rebello, 2013). We also show a more pronounced effect for
ﬁrms that are more ﬁnancially constrained and ﬁrms that have more severe agency problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 de-
scribes the data and research design issues. Section 4 shows the results of the regression analysis on the association between enforce-
ment and the sensitivity of investment growth to return. Section 5 presents cross-sectional analyses attempting to uncover the
mechanisms throughwhich enforcement affects capital allocation efﬁciency. Section 6 examines the effect of enforcement on ﬁrm op-
erating performance. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Prior literature and hypothesis development
2.1. Insider trading restriction and price efﬁciency
Economic theory suggests that uninformed investors protect themselves from trading against insiders by decreasing liquidity and
participation in trading (Kyle, 1985; Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1991). Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) show that increased liquidity trad-
ingmotivates information acquisition and informed trading by outside investors, which leads tomore informative stock prices. Chordia
et al. (2008) present empirical evidence showing that increased liquidity stimulates informed risk arbitrage activity and enhances price
2 See, for example, Carlton and Fischel (1983), Manove (1989), Ausubel (1990), Leland (1992), and Khanna et al. (1994).
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efﬁciency. Fishman and Hagerty (1992) demonstrate that restricting insider trading encourages outside investors to acquire private in-
formation and trade more aggressively. Under certain conditions, the gain in price efﬁciency resulting frommore informed trading by
outside investors exceeds the loss in price informativeness arising from prohibitions on insider trading. In this case, restricting insider
trading results in a net increase in price efﬁciency. Empirical evidence supports the notion that curbing insider trading enhances liquid-
ity, participation by outside investors, and stock price efﬁciency. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) ﬁnd that trading volume increases
after enforcement. Christensen et al. (2016) ﬁnd increased market liquidity in EU countries when new regulations concerning insider
trading,marketmanipulation and corporate transparency are put in force. Bushman et al. (2005) document increased analyst following
after enforcement, suggesting more active participation by investors after enforcement. Finally, Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) show
improved price efﬁciency and liquidity after enforcement.3
2.2. Price efﬁciency and capital allocation efﬁciency
Based on the framework outlined by Bushman and Smith (2001), more efﬁcient prices lead to more efﬁcient capital allocation
through at least three channels. First, stock prices can guide corporate investment by providing information for managers to eval-
uate investment opportunities (Dow and Gorton, 1997). Optimal decision-making depends not only on the internal information
available to the ﬁrm (such as technology, production costs, and strategies), but also on external information (such as the state
of the economy, the position of competitors, and the demand from consumers). While managers would certainly have better in-
ternal information, outside informed investors are likely to have external information that managers may not know (Bond et al.,
2012). Although the amount of information from each individual investor might be negligible, the market aggregates all informa-
tion from a large population of investors so that the total amount of information can be signiﬁcant (Subrahmanyam and Titman,
1999). Managers can extract useful information from the prices of their own ﬁrm and of their peer ﬁrms to guide their capital
allocation decisions. Consistent with this notion, the existing literature ﬁnds that a ﬁrm's investment is sensitive to its own
stock prices and to those of its peers, and the sensitivity is positively associated with its own price informativeness and that of
its peers (Chen et al., 2007; Ozoguz and Rebello, 2013; Foucault and Frésard, 2014). Badertscher et al. (2013) show that the pres-
ence of public ﬁrms in an industry provides information for private ﬁrms to evaluate investment opportunities more accurately
and thereby increases their capital allocation efﬁciency.
Second, efﬁcient prices improve capital allocation efﬁciency by giving the right incentives to managers who have discretions in
making decisions (Dow and Gorton, 1997; Bond et al., 2012). Efﬁcient prices are key inputs to external governance devices, such
as the corporate control market, by conveying precise signals about the quality of managers' decisions and when to intervene
(Durnev et al., 2004). Edmans (2009) argues that more informative prices encourage managers to undertake efﬁcient real invest-
ment by revealing the long-run value of the investment. Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) posit that informative prices increase
insiders' incentives to take value-maximizing actions by revealing the consequences of their actions precisely and promptly. In
addition, more informative prices increase the effectiveness of incentive compensation in aligning the interests of managers
and shareholders (Holmström and Tirole, 1993). Kang and Liu (2008) ﬁnd that more informative prices are associated with
more powerful incentive contracts based on stock prices. Finally, efﬁcient prices increase board monitoring effectiveness by mak-
ing the board better informed (Ferreira et al., 2011). Consistent with this view, Ferreira et al. (2011) ﬁnd a negative association
between board independence and stock price informativeness, suggesting that more informative prices reduce the need for
board independence. This negative association is more pronounced when ﬁrms have fewer takeover defenses, more concentrated
institutional ownership, and higher CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. The evidence is consistent with the notion that more in-
formative prices increase the effectiveness of external monitoring and incentive contracts, which further reduces the need for
board independence.4
Third, one important impediment to efﬁcient capital allocation is the adverse selection problemwhich prevents the transfer of cap-
ital fromﬁrmswith bad growth opportunities to thosewith good opportunities (Fisman and Love, 2004).More efﬁcientmarkets reduce
information asymmetry betweenmanagers and outside investors and help identify entrepreneurs that have access to good investment
opportunities. More efﬁcient prices also help reduce investors' risk of estimating the intrinsic value of a ﬁrm, thereby decreasing the
required rate of return (Lambert et al., 2007). Naiker et al. (2013) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more active option trading have a lower cost
of equity, consistent with the view that option trading reduces information asymmetry and increases price informativeness (Ho et
al., 1995). Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) suggest that the cost of equity is negatively associated with price informativeness. Sunder
(2004) ﬁnds that more informative equity prices are associated with a lower cost of debt. Thus, more efﬁcient prices help reduce the
cost of raising external capital and relax ﬁnancing constraints.
3 In addition, as insiders are likely to beneﬁt more from their trades when information asymmetry is high, restricting insider trading could improvemarket efﬁciency
bymotivating them to improve the quality of public disclosure andﬁnancial reporting. Zhang and Zhang (2014) and Jayaraman (2012) both ﬁnd an increase inﬁnancial
reporting quality after enforcement.
4 Several studies suggest that restrictions on insider trading may directly mitigate agency problems. Manove (1989) and Ausubel (1990) suggest that insiders can
expropriate outside investors by trading on foreknowledge about investment outcomes. Anticipating this, investors will distort stock investment to protect themselves.
Bebchuk and Fershtman (1990) argue that managers may distort investment decisions in order to increase insider trading proﬁts.
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Prior studies have shown that more efﬁcient capital allocation is associated with mechanisms that help alleviate market frictions
arising frommoral hazard and adverse selection. For example, the literature ﬁnds that resources are allocatedmore efﬁciently in coun-
tries with more developed ﬁnancial markets (Wurgler, 2000; Fisman and Love, 2004), more transparent information environments
(Francis et al., 2009; Biddle and Hilary, 2006), accounting practices that recognize loss more timely (Bushman et al., 2011; Lara et al.,
2016), and stronger investor protection (Wurgler, 2000; McLean et al., 2012).
2.3. Hypotheses
The literature discussed above suggests that enforcement enhances the liquidity and the information efﬁciency of stock prices,
which leads to more efﬁcient capital allocation, by providing more relevant information for managers to guide their investment deci-
sions and bymitigatingmarket frictions arising from adverse selection andmoral hazard. The discussion leads to the following testable
hypotheses.
H1. Capital allocation efﬁciency increases after enforcement.
H2a. The increase in capital allocation efﬁciency after enforcement is positively associated with the increase in price efﬁciency after
enforcement.
In addition, insiders are likely to trade more aggressively when information environments are opaque (Aboody et al., 2005). Thus,
the effect of enforcement on liquidity and price efﬁciency is likely to be greater in countries that have more opaque information envi-
ronments before enforcement. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis.
H2b. The increase in capital allocation efﬁciency after enforcement is more pronounced in countries with more opaque information environ-
ments before enforcement.
As discussed before, outside informed investors are more likely to possess external information about the status of competitors, the
industry, and customer demand that managers may not know (Bond et al., 2012). The importance of such information for decision-
making is likely to vary across the competitive landscape. More intense competition exposes ﬁrms more strongly to changes in their
peers' fortunes and strategies (Ozoguz and Rebello, 2013), which increases the value of external information. Therefore, the potential
beneﬁt for managers of learning from the stock prices of their own ﬁrm or of peer ﬁrms is greater when their ﬁrms are operating in a
more competitive product market. Consistent with this notion, Ozoguz and Rebello (2013) ﬁnd that a ﬁrm's investment is more sensi-
tive to the prices of its peer ﬁrmswhen it is operating in amore competitive productmarket. Chircop et al. (2016) also provide evidence
that the peer learning effect is stronger in more competitive product markets. Thus, to the extent that enforcement improves capital
allocation efﬁciency by enabling stock prices to provide more information to guide managers' decisions, the improvement is expected
to be more pronounced for ﬁrms that operate in more competitive product markets. The above discussion leads to the following
hypothesis.
H3. The increase in capital allocation efﬁciency after enforcement is more pronounced for ﬁrms operating in more competitive product
markets.
Investments of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are less responsive to investment opportunities because external ﬁnancing is costly
(Hubbard, 1998). Thus, the beneﬁt of a reduction in external ﬁnancing costs should be greater for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. Consis-
tentwith this notion, Rajan and Zingales (1998) ﬁnd that industry sectorswith higher external ﬁnancing needs grow faster in countries
withmore developedﬁnancialmarkets. Thus, to the extent that enforcement improves capital allocation efﬁciency by reducing external
ﬁnancing costs and relaxing external ﬁnancing constraints, the effect should be more pronounced for more ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms.
Firms with more severe agency conﬂict between insiders and outside investors also make less efﬁcient capital allocation deci-
sions. The inefﬁciency can arise from shirking or expropriation of investment opportunities (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003;
Johnson et al., 2000), or result from a waste of free cash ﬂows in projects with negative net present value (Hubbard, 1998). Con-
sistent with this notion, Jiang et al. (2011) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a positive wedge between the largest shareholder's control rights
and cash ﬂow rights make investments that are less sensitivity to investment opportunities. The above discussion leads to the fol-
lowing two hypotheses.
H4. The increase in capital allocation efﬁciency after enforcement is more pronounced for more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
H5. The increase in capital allocation efﬁciency after enforcement is more pronounced for ﬁrms with more severe agency problems between
insiders and outside shareholders.
Several studies suggest that enforcement may reduce the efﬁciency of capital resource allocation. Carlton and Fischel (1983) argue
that insider trading can be an efﬁcient way of motivating managers to acquire and develop private information to guide their invest-
ment decisions. In addition, insider trading can motivate risk-averse managers to undertake risky projects that would beneﬁt share-
holders (Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1994). This possibility adds tension to our prediction and, if valid, would increase the difﬁculty in
ﬁnding an improvement in capital allocation efﬁciency after enforcement.
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3. Research design and data
3.1. Model speciﬁcation
Our analysis follows the literature on capital allocation efﬁciencywhich is built on the q-theory of optimal investment.5 The q-theory
suggests that under certain assumptions, the sensitivity of investments to investment opportunities (λ) is a function of capital adjust-
ment costs. A lower adjustment cost implies a higher value of sensitivity (λ) and thus more efﬁcient capital allocation. We follow
Wurgler (2000) and Bushman et al. (2011) and use the ﬁrst-order difference model to derive our empirical speciﬁcation.6
Δ ln
Ii;t
Ki;t−1
 !
¼ λΔqi;t−1; ð1Þ
where Δq is the change in the natural logarithm of marginal Q. Prior literature has suggested that corporate investment is also
inﬂuenced by internal cash ﬂow (e.g., Hubbard, 1998). We therefore extend Eq. (1) by adding changes in operating cash ﬂow
(Δcf) to give our empirical regression model as follows7:
Δ ln
Ii;t
Ki;t1
 !
¼ λΔqi;t1 þ γΔcf i;t1: ð2Þ
Wurgler (2000) interprets the market frictions arising from information acquisition costs, moral hazard, and adverse selection as
capital adjustment costs in general. Following this rationale, we model λ as a function of enforcement, which we hypothesize would
reduce market frictions. We adopt a DID approach to examine the effect of enforcement on the sensitivity of investment growth to
Δq (λ). In particular, we model λ as follows8:
λ ¼ λ1ITENFk;t þ∑
45
k¼1
ωkμk þ ∑
2003
t¼1982
θtwt þ∑
44
j¼1
φ jv j þ λ2SIZEi;t−1 þ λ3MBi;t−1 þ λ4GDPk;t ; ð3Þ
where i, j, k and t are subscripts for ﬁrm, industry, country, and year, respectively; and μk, vj, and wt are the ﬁxed effects of coun-
try, industry, and year, respectively. ITENFk,t is a dummy variable that equals one for the years after (excluding the year of) en-
forcement, and zero otherwise.
Eq. (3) represents a DID design (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Christensen et al., 2016). To see this, note that ωk captures the
average sensitivity of investment growth to Δq of country k and takes away the difference in average sensitivity across countries. θt
(t= 1982 to 2003) controls for the time trend of sensitivity in the absence of enforcement and also eliminates the impact of shocks
common to all countries in a given year on sensitivity. As a result, the identiﬁcation stems from the cross-country variation in the en-
forcement year, and λ1 measures the within-country change in sensitivity post enforcement after controlling for the time trend of sen-
sitivity. Essentially, the treatment countries include those that began enforcing insider trading laws within our sample period (i.e., from
1982 to 2003).9 For a country whose enforcement occurred in year t, Eq. (3) implicitly takes all countries whose enforcement did not
occur in year t as the control group (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003).
We also include a set of control variables to allow the sensitivity of investment growth to Δq to vary by ﬁrm, industry, and (time-
varying) country-level characteristics. These controls include ﬁrm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratios (MB), industry ﬁxed effects (vj),
and annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) (Wurgler, 2000; Bushman et al., 2011).10
We substitute Eq. (3) into Eq. (2) to derive our baseline regressionmodel.We also include all variables on the right-hand side of Eq.
(3) in intercepts to prevent their direct effect on the investment growth rate from contaminating estimates of the sensitivity of
5 See, for example, Tobin (1969), Hayashi (1982), Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996), Wurgler (2000), and Bushman et al. (2011).
6 More speciﬁcally, Abel and Eberly (1996) consider a capital adjustment cost functionCðI;KÞ ¼ λ1þλ ðI=KÞ
1þλ
λ K, whereλ N 0 and is an exogenous parameter. They show
that the optimal investment should follow I/K=Qλ, where Q is the shadow price of capital, or marginal Q. Taking the logarithm of both sides and then taking the ﬁrst-
order difference generates Eq. (1).
7 Our results are qualitatively the same if we drop Δcf.
8 As we include indicator variables for country, industry, and year, we do not include a separate intercept.
9 Thus, the six countries whose enforcement occurred before our sample period (i.e., the U.S., the U.K., Canada, France, Singapore, and Brazil) only serve as control
countries. Note that there is nowithin-country variation in ITENF for these countries. Our research design is consistentwith prior studies that use data on these six coun-
tries to adjust for the trend of the variable of interest (Bushman et al., 2005; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009).
10 Prior literature has also examined the effect of country-level institutional factors on capital resource allocation (e.g.,Wurgler, 2000; Bushman et al., 2011;McLean et
al., 2012). Themeasures of country-level institutional factors used in these studies are speciﬁc to certain countries and do not vary over time, and thus are absorbed by
the country ﬁxed effects in Eq. (3).
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investment growth to Δq. Thus, our baseline regression is as follows:
Δ ln CAPXi;t
 
¼ β1ITENFk;t þ λ1Δqj;t−1  ITENFk;t þ β2SIZEi;t−1 þ λ2Δqj;t−1  SIZEi;t−1þ
β3MBi;t−1 þ λ3Δqj;t−1 MBi;t−1 þ β4GDPk;t þ λ4Δqj;t−1  GDPk;t þ γ1Δcf i;t−1þ
∑
45
k¼1
ϖkμk þ∑
45
k¼1
ωkμk  Δqj;t−1 þ∑
44
j¼1
ϕ jv j þ∑
44
j¼1
φ jv j  Δqj;t−1 þ ∑
2003
t¼1982
ϑtwt þ ∑
2003
t¼1982
θtwt  Δqj;t−1 þ εi;t ;
ð4Þ
where Δln(CAPX) is our measure of the investment growth rate. Following the prior literature (e.g., Bushman et al., 2011), we mea-
sure investment (I/K) in Eq. (2) by capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by lagged total assets. Scaling CAPX by lagged property, plant, and
equipment (PPE) or not scaling CAPX does not change the results qualitatively.WemeasureΔq by the lagged industry returns of the US-
listed ﬁrms, where the industry is deﬁned according to Fama and French's (1997) 48-industry classiﬁcation. This design choice is based
on two assumptions. First, there exist commonglobal industry-speciﬁc shocks to growth opportunities (Fisman and Love, 2004). Second,
such shocks are best measured by the industry returns of US-listed ﬁrms because of the well-developed ﬁnancial market institutions in
the US (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Fisman and Love, 2007).11 As a robustness test, we also measure Δq by the ﬁrm-speciﬁc change in
Tobin's Q and ﬁnd qualitatively similar results. Δcf is the change in the logarithm of one plus operating cash ﬂow scaled by total assets,
where operating cash ﬂow is deﬁned as net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization. SIZE is deﬁned as the
logarithmof the book value of total assets.MB is deﬁned as the logarithmof themarket value of equity plus the book value of total assets
minus the book value of equity, scaled by the book value of total assets. GDP is the logarithm of per capita GDP in US dollars. See
Appendix A for detailed variable deﬁnitions. H1 predicts a positive coefﬁcient on the interaction term of Δq × ITENF, i.e., λ1 N 0.
3.2. Data, sample selection, and summary statistics
The data of the adoption and the initial enforcement of insider trading laws come fromBhattacharya andDaouk (2002), who obtain-
ed the data from surveys sent to the stock exchanges and national regulators of 103 stockmarkets. The ﬁrst enforcement of insider trad-
ing laws signals to the markets that the probability of future prosecution of insider trading has had a discrete jump up (Bhattacharya
and Daouk, 2002). The data have been widely used in the literature to measure a shock to insider trading regulation (e.g., Bushman
et al., 2005; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009).
Consistentwith Fernandes and Ferreira (2009), we collect all ﬁrm-year observations between 1982 and 2003 fromWorldscope. Fol-
lowing the literature, we deleteﬁrms inﬁnancial industries (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999).We also remove ﬁrmswith total assets
or market value of equity below US$10 million. Finally, we delete observations lacking information on investment growth (ΔlnCAPX),
ﬁrm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratios (MB), or operating cashﬂow growth (Δcf). Our ﬁnal sample consists of 143,266 ﬁrm-year obser-
vations from 22,188 ﬁrms in 45 countries. Among these observations, 123,343 (involving 17,924 ﬁrms) come from 23 developedmar-
kets, and 19,923 (involving 4264 ﬁrms) come from 22 emerging markets.
Table 1 shows the sample distribution across countries. Table 1 also shows the year inwhich insider trading lawswere ﬁrst adopted
and the year of initial enforcement in each country as obtained from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). Table 2 presents the summary
statistics for the main variables used in this study. The mean (median) value of Δln(CAPX) is−0.069 (−0.044), and the inter-quartile
range is 0.758. These statistics are comparable to those reported in Bushman et al. (2011). Themean andmedian of the industry return
of US-listed ﬁrms (Δq) are 0.081 and 0.093, respectively.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Baseline regressions
Table 3 presents the results of the pooled sample regressions. Column (1) reports the results of our baseline regression. The results
provide strong support to our hypothesis (H1). The coefﬁcient ofΔq× ITENF is 0.253 and signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t-stat= 2.93). The
results suggest that capital allocation efﬁciency, asmeasured by the sensitivity of investment growth to return, is signiﬁcantly higher in
the post-enforcement period than in the pre-enforcement period after controlling for the country and year ﬁxed effects on sensitivity.
The coefﬁcient is also economically signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF from the baseline regression (0.253) suggests that the in-
vestment growth associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in shocks to investment opportunities (Δq, 0.229 from Table 2) is
about 6% higher in the post-enforcement period than in the pre-enforcement period (e0.253 × 0.229− 1 = 0.06).
Regarding the control variables, we ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of Δcf (coeff. = 0.878; t-stat = 8.11). The coefﬁcient of Δq
× SIZE is negative (coeff. =−0.016; t-stat =−3.03). Bushman et al. (2011) also ﬁnd a negative though insigniﬁcant effect of ﬁrm
size on the sensitivity of investment growth to return. The coefﬁcient of Δq ×MB is positive though insigniﬁcant (coeff. = 0.033; t-
stat = 1.29), and so is the coefﬁcient of Δq × GDP (coeff. = 0.172; t-stat = 0.93).12 The coefﬁcient of SIZE is negative (coeff. =
11 Controlling for the interactions betweenΔq and GDP and country ﬁxed effects also helps tomitigate the potential errors inmeasuringΔqwhich are correlatedwith
economic development (Fisman and Love, 2004).
12 This result is not inconsistent with prior literature which has foundmore efﬁcient capital allocation in countries with higher GDP (e.g., Wurgler, 2000; Bushman et
al., 2011). Prior studies typically compute average GDP over a period for each country and measure GDP in a particular year. We have controlled for the interactions
between Δq and country ﬁxed effects, which takes away the effect of cross-country variation in GDP on sensitivity. If we drop the interactions betweenΔq and country
ﬁxed effects, the coefﬁcient of Δq × GDP becomes signiﬁcantly positive (results not reported).
693Z. Chen et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 45 (2017) 687–709
Table 1
Sample distribution and country-level variables.
Country N IT enforcement
year
IT existence
year
GOODGOV Country N IT enforcement
year
IT existence
year
GOODGOV
Developed markets Emerging markets
Australia (AUS) 2835 1996 1991 26.50 Argentina (ARG) 224 1995 1991 16.84
Austria (AUT) 786 1993 27.86 Brazil (BRA) 1231 1978 1976 20.24
Belgium (BEL) 987 1994 1990 27.93 Chile (CHL) 663 1996 1981 19.60
Canada (CAN) 5589 1976 1966 28.63 Colombia (COL) 132 1990 18.97
Denmark (DNK) 1446 1996 1991 28.98 Egypt (EGY) 25 1992
Finland (FIN) 1106 1993 1989 28.82 India (IDN) 993 1998 1992 18.44
France (FRA) 6159 1975 1967 27.89 Indonesia (IND) 2118 1996 1991 15.40
Germany (DEU) 5556 1995 1994 28.60 Israel (ISR) 333 1989 1981 24.12
Greece (GRC) 168 1996 1988 21.01 Jordan (JOR) 12
Hong Kong (HKG) 2625 1994 1991 25.63 South Korea (KOR) 2785 1988 1976 22.20
Ireland (IRL) 566 1990 27.15 Malaysia (MYS) 2907 1996 1973 22.76
Italy (ITA) 1921 1996 1991 24.65 Mexico (MEX) 750 1975 18.61
Japan (JPN) 18,114 1990 1988 27.88 Pakistan (PAK) 475 1995 13.47
Netherlands (NLD) 2030 1994 1989 29.33 Peru (PER) 187 1994 1991 14.92
New Zealand (NZL) 495 1988 28.98 Philippines (PHL) 436 1982 12.94
Norway (NOR) 1113 1990 1985 29.59 South Africa (ZAF) 2018 1989 23.07
Portugal (PRT) 411 1986 24.85 Sri Lanka (LKA) 68 1996 1987 16.30
Singapore (SGP) 1982 1978 1973 26.38 Taiwan (TWN) 2440 1989 1988 25.13
Spain (ESP) 1371 1998 1994 25.30 Thailand (THA) 1633 1993 1984 20.17
Sweden (SWE) 1806 1990 1971 28.98 Turkey (TUR) 390 1996 1981 18.13
Switzerland (CHE) 1867 1995 1988 29.96 Venezuela (VEN) 70 1998 17.89
United Kingdom (GBR) 13,970 1981 1980 28.44 Zimbabwe (ZWE) 33
United States (USA) 50,440 1961 1934 27.61
Total 123,343 Total 19,923
Mean 27.43 18.91
Min 21.01 12.94
Max 29.96 25.13
Note: This table shows the distribution of ﬁrm-year observations across the 45 countries included in this study and the country-level variables. IT enforcement year
is the year in which insider trading laws were initially enforced. IT existence year is the year in which the insider trading laws were ﬁrst instituted. Both variables
are from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). N is the number of ﬁrm-year observations. GOODGOV is an index measuring how much respect the country's govern-
ment has for private property rights from La Porta et al. (1998).
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Percentiles
Variable N Mean Std dev 25% 50% 75%
Δln(CAPXi,t) 143,266 −0.069 0.691 −0.437 −0.044 0.321
Δln(CAPXRDi,t) 143,266 −0.049 0.646 −0.376 −0.026 0.297
Δln(TAGi,t) 143,266 −0.006 0.225 −0.129 0.003 0.127
Δln(CAPXi,t−1) 128,572 −0.097 0.699 −0.466 −0.061 0.303
Δqj,t − 1 143,266 0.081 0.229 −0.059 0.093 0.228
HERFk,j,t−1 134,490 0.187 0.172 0.058 0.132 0.254
Δcfi,t-1 143,266 0.006 0.060 −0.015 0.007 0.029
SIZEi,t−1 143,266 5.721 1.719 4.446 5.534 6.835
LEVi,t−1 143,262 0.248 0.185 0.093 0.228 0.370
MBi,t−1 143,266 0.251 0.427 −0.036 0.167 0.471
ΔLIQUIDi 16,226 0.141 1.599 −0.735 0.238 1.071
WWi,t−1 140,739 −0.905 0.087 −0.966 −0.903 −0.843
WEDGEi 35,509 0.041 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.051
ROAi,t+1 131,181 0.07 0.088 0.021 0.063 0.117
lnSALEi,t 131,181 5.792 1.666 4.575 5.643 6.861
OPACITYk 51,259 6.062 1.422 4.917 5.917 7.667
GDPk,t 143,266 9.880 0.865 9.820 10.128 10.391
FDk,t 120,940 1.910 0.738 1.418 1.990 2.407
Note: i, j, k, and t are subscripts forﬁrm, industry, country, andyear.Δln(CAPX) is the growth rate of capital expenditure.Δln(CAPX) is the growth rate of capital expenditure
plus R&D expenditures.Δln(TAG) is natural logarithm of total assets growth rate.Δq is themean industry return of US-listed ﬁrms.Δcf is the growth rate of operating cash
ﬂows. SIZE is ﬁrm size.MB is themarket-to-book ratio. LEV is leverage.WW is theWhited andWu (2006) index of ﬁnancial constraints.WEDGE is thewedge between the
voting rights and cash ﬂow rights of the largest shareholder. ROA is return on assets. lnSALE is the natural logarithm of sales revenue.HERF is the Herﬁndahl index of sales.
GDP is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP. FD is the ﬁnancial development index. For the treatment countries, i.e., countries whose enforcement occurred within our
sample period (from 1982 to 2003), OPACITY is deﬁned the earnings opacity index before the enforcement year. OPACITY is set to zero for other countries. For ﬁrms in the
treatment countries, ΔLIQUID is deﬁned as the change in liquidity around the enforcement year. ΔLIQUID is set to zero for ﬁrms in other countries. This table shows the
summary statistics of OPACITY and ΔLIQUID for the treatment countries. See Appendix A for the detailed deﬁnitions of variables.
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−0.006; t-stat =−2.86) and that ofMB is positive (coeff. = 0.04; t-stat = 4.34). This suggests that large ﬁrms tend to have lower un-
conditional investment growth and ﬁrms with high market-to-book tend to have higher unconditional investment growth. The coef-
ﬁcient of GDP is negative (coeff. =−0.371; t-stat =−6.39).13
Column (2) of Table 3 considers the effect of the existence of insider trading laws (ITEXIST) by adding ITEXIST andΔq× ITEXIST to the
regression. ITEXIST is a dummy variable that equals one for the years after the adoption of insider trading laws, and zero otherwise. This
speciﬁcation aims at examiningwhether it is themere existence or the actual enforcement of insider trading laws that affectsmanagers'
investment decisions. Consistentwith the prior literature suggesting that insider trading laws are not effective unless they are enforced,
the coefﬁcient ofΔq× ITEXIST is insigniﬁcant (coeff. = 0.088; t-stat = 0.92). The coefﬁcient ofΔq × ITENF remains positive and signif-
icant (coeff. = 0.217; t-stat = 2.15).
Column (3) further allows enforcement to affect the sensitivity of investment growth to the growth in operating cash ﬂow. In par-
ticular, we interact Δcfwith ITENF and the ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year. Thus, the coefﬁcient of Δcf × ITENFmeasures the
treatment effect of enforcement on the sensitivity of investment growth to the growth in operating cash ﬂow. The coefﬁcient of Δq
× ITENF continues to be signiﬁcantly positive (coeff. = 0.253; t-stat = 2.91). The coefﬁcient of Δcf × ITENF is negative, although insig-
niﬁcant (coeff. =−0.338; t-stat =−0.72).14
13 Again, sincewe control for the countryﬁxed effect, this coefﬁcient does notmeasure cross-country association between per capita GDP and investment growth. This
coefﬁcient becomes insigniﬁcant if we drop the country ﬁxed effect.
14 We also conduct a robustness check by adding the ﬁrm ﬁxed effect in the baseline regression. The results are qualitative similar. The coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF re-
mains signiﬁcantly positive (coeff. = 0.251; t-stat = 2.64). This is not surprising as our baseline model is already a ﬁrst-difference model and has removed the time-
invariant heterogeneity at the ﬁrm level.
Table 3
The initial enforcement of insider trading laws and capital allocation efﬁciency.
Independent variable Baseline model
(1)
Control for ITEXIST
(2)
Interact Δcf with ITENF
(3)
ITEXISTk,t 0.024
(0.62)
ITENFk,t −0.030 −0.039 −0.028
(−1.18) (−1.24) (−1.00)
Δqj,t−1 × ITEXISTk,t 0.088
(0.92)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t 0.253⁎⁎⁎ 0.217⁎⁎ 0.253⁎⁎⁎
(2.93) (2.15) (2.91)
Δqj,t−1 × SIZEi,t-1 −0.016⁎⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎⁎
(−3.03) (−3.03) (−3.14)
Δqj,t−1 × MBi,t-1 0.033 0.033 0.026
(1.29) (1.32) (1.06)
Δqj,t−1 × GDPk,t 0.172 0.167 0.175
(0.93) (0.92) (0.97)
Δcfi,t−1 0.878⁎⁎⁎ 0.878⁎⁎⁎ 0.639⁎⁎⁎
(8.11) (8.10) (5.09)
Δcfi,t−1 × ITENFk,t −0.338
(−0.72)
SIZEi,t−1 −0.006⁎⁎⁎ −0.006⁎⁎⁎ −0.006⁎⁎⁎
(−2.86) (−2.83) (−2.79)
MBi,t−1 0.040⁎⁎⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎ 0.039⁎⁎⁎
(4.34) (4.36) (4.38)
GDPk,t −0.371⁎⁎⁎ −0.372⁎⁎⁎ −0.364⁎⁎⁎
(−6.39) (−6.30) (−6.48)
Δqj,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes Yes
Δcfi,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year No No Yes
Fixed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.029 0.031
No. of Obs. 143,266 143,266 143,266
Note: i, j, k, and t are subscripts for ﬁrm, industry, country, and year. The dependent variable is the investment growth rate,Δln(CAPXi,t).Δq is themean industry return of
US-listed ﬁrms. Δcf is the growth rate of operating cash ﬂows. SIZE is ﬁrm size.MB is the market-to-book ratio. GDP is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP. ITENF is a
dummy variable that equals one in the years after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, and zero otherwise. ITEXIST is a dummy variable that equals one in the
period after the country instituted its insider trading laws, and zero otherwise. Industry ﬁxed effects are deﬁned based on Fama and French's (1997) 48-industry classi-
ﬁcation. See Appendix A for the detailed deﬁnitions of variables. No. of Obs. is the number of ﬁrm-year observations. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
695Z. Chen et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 45 (2017) 687–709
4.2. Separating developed and emerging markets
Prior studies have shown that the economic consequences of enforcing insider trading laws can differ across developed versus
emerging markets. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) ﬁnd a more pronounced decrease in the cost of equity in emerging markets.
Bushman et al. (2005) document a more pronounced increase in analyst activity after enforcement in emerging markets. In contrast,
Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) ﬁnd that enforcement only increases price informativeness in developed markets. Zhang and Zhang
(2014) ﬁnd a more pronounced increase in ﬁnancial reporting quality after enforcement. We therefore examine whether the effect
of enforcement on capital allocation efﬁciency differs between the two types of markets.
The results are presented in Table 4. We ﬁnd that the effect of enforcement on capital allocation efﬁciency is signiﬁcant only in the
developedmarkets. Column (1) shows that the coefﬁcient ofΔq× ITENF is signiﬁcant and positive (coeff.= 0.336; t-stat= 4.43)when
we include only observations in the developedmarkets.15 In contrast, the coefﬁcient is negative and insigniﬁcant when the baseline re-
gression is estimated using the emerging markets observations (coeff. =−0.201; t-stat =−1.20). A formal test shows that the coef-
ﬁcient ofΔq× ITENF is signiﬁcantly different between the two subsamples (p-value= 0.003). In Column (3)weuse the full sample and
interact an indicator variable for the emergingmarkets (Emerging Market) with ITENF and Δq × ITENF. Emerging Market equals one for
ﬁrms from the emergingmarkets, and zero otherwise. The results are qualitatively the same. The coefﬁcient ofΔq× ITENF is signiﬁcant-
ly positive (coeff. = 0.317; t-stat = 4.13), and the coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF × Emerging Market is signiﬁcantly negative (coeff. =
−0.462; t-stat =−3.48). The sum of the coefﬁcients of Δq × ITENF and Δq × ITENF × Emerging Market is insigniﬁcant (p-value =
0.233).16
As discussed at the outset, Christensen et al. (2016) argue that the effect of regulations could either be weaker or stronger in coun-
tries with weaker institutions before regulation. On one hand, the regulation effect can be stronger in countries with weak prior insti-
tutions because regulation effectively reduces the existing differences between countries. On the other hand, in countries with weak
institutions and inefﬁcient bureaucracies, new regulations aremore likely to be abused (Djankov et al., 2003; Shleifer, 2005).Moreover,
a country's track record of implementing regulations is likely to reveal its political willingness to induce socially desirable behavior. As
developed countries have stronger institutions and are also likely to have better track records of enforcing regulations, our results ap-
pear to be consistent with the latter view.
In addition, Morck et al. (2000) argue that the protection of property rights might have to reach a critical threshold in order to mo-
tivemarket participants to engage in informed risk arbitragewhichwould contribute to price efﬁciency. Fernandes and Ferreira (2009)
argue that in emergingmarkets, when enforcement eliminates the contribution of insider trading to price informativeness, outside in-
formed participants cannot make up for the information lost. Furthermore, Bushman and Smith (2001) and Stulz (2005) suggest that
the mechanisms that restrict managers' rent-seeking behavior and reduce the cost of external ﬁnancing may have limited beneﬁts
when the government shows little respect for property rights. Consistent with this view, Durnev et al. (2009) ﬁnd that corporate trans-
parency (including price informativeness) is less able to improve capital allocation efﬁciency in countries with a weaker protection of
property rights. Our results also appear to be consistent with the arguments and ﬁndings in these papers. As shown in Table 1, the de-
veloped and emerging markets are split into two clusters with respect to how much respect the government has for property rights
(GOODGOV), which is deﬁned as the sum of the following three indexes from La Porta et al. (1998): (1) government corruption, (2)
the risk that the government will expropriate private property, and (3) the risk that the government will repudiate contracts.17
As the effect of enforcement on capital allocation efﬁciency is only signiﬁcant in the developed markets, we focus on these markets
in the following analysis.18
4.3. Testing the robustness of the identiﬁcation strategy
One limitation of the above pooled sample analysis is that the sample includes data in the periods long after the initial enforcement
and allows other confounding factors to take effect. Alternatively, the interaction terms between Δq and year ﬁxed effects may not be
able to sufﬁciently control for possible trends of the sensitivity of investment growth toΔq. To address these concerns, we conduct two
robustness tests for our identiﬁcation strategy. First, we examine the change in the sensitivity of investment growth to return within a
relatively short window around the enforcement year. If we again ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in sensitivity, we can be more conﬁdent
that the increase is attributed to enforcement. Second,we randomly assign a year as the pseudo enforcement year for eachﬁrm in coun-
tries that started enforcing their insider trading laws before our sample period or in countries that did not enforce their insider trading
laws until after our sample period. We then compare the change in capital allocation efﬁciency around the true enforcement year
15 Regarding the economic signiﬁcance, the coefﬁcient estimate of Δq × ITENF based on the developed markets sample (0.336) suggests that the investment growth
associatedwith a one-standard-deviation increase in shocks to investment opportunities (0.229) is about 8% higher in the post-enforcement period than in the pre-en-
forcement period (e0.336 × 0.229− 1 = 0.08).
16 Greece and Portugal are classiﬁed as emergingmarkets in Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and Bushman et al. (2005), but as developed markets in Fernandes and
Ferreira (2009). Our results are the same for either classiﬁcation.
17 Only three countries in the developed markets (Greece, Portugal, and Italy) have a GOODGOV value lower than the maximum value in the emergingmarkets (Tai-
wan, 25.13).
18 We also notice that our sample is similar to those of Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) and Zhang and Zhang (2014), but is quite different from those of Bhattacharya
and Daouk (2002) and Bushman et al. (2005) in terms of howmany countries in the emergingmarkets are covered. It is possible that our emergingmarkets sample is
not powerful enough to detect the effect of the enforcement on capital allocation efﬁciency. Thus, we refrain from making strong conclusions based on the results in
emerging markets.
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against that around the pseudo enforcement year. If the improvement in capital allocation efﬁciency is driven by enforcement, thenwe
should observe a signiﬁcant change in capital allocation efﬁciency only around the true enforcement year but not around the pseudo
enforcement year. We explain the design in detail and present the results for the two robustness tests below.
4.3.1. The change in capital allocation efﬁciency around the enforcement year
We modify the baseline regression model and replace ITENF with a series of indicators for event years relative to the enforce-
ment year (i.e., year 0). Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne D[−2, 0] as a dummy variable that equals one for years [−2,0] relative to the en-
forcement year, and zero otherwise. D[+1, +3] is deﬁned as a dummy variable that equals one for years [+1,+3] relative to the
enforcement year and zero otherwise. D[N + 3] is deﬁned as a dummy variable that equals one for the period starting in year +4
and beyond, and zero otherwise. Thus, the benchmark period is the period prior to year −2 relative to the enforcement year.
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 5.We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in the sensitivity of investment growth to return in the
relatively short period around the enforcement year. The coefﬁcient of Δq × D[−2,0] (λD[−2,0]) is negative but insigniﬁcant (coeff. =
−0.115; t-stat =−1.00), suggesting no signiﬁcant change in sensitivity right before the enforcement year. The coefﬁcient of Δq
× D[+1, +3] (λD[+1, +3]) is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level (coeff. = 0.238; t-stat = 2.52). A formal test shows that λD[+1,
+3]− λD[−2, 0] is signiﬁcantly positive (p-value = 0.015), suggesting a signiﬁcant improvement in capital allocation efﬁciency right
after enforcement. The coefﬁcient of Δq × D[N+3] (λD[N +3]) is also signiﬁcantly positive (coeff. = 0.334; t-stat = 4.83) and higher
than λD[+1, +3], although the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.310). Overall, the results increase our conﬁdence
that the improvement in capital allocation efﬁciency in the developed markets is attributed to enforcement. Furthermore, the results
suggest that the effect of enforcement is long-lasting.
4.3.2. The change in capital allocation efﬁciency around the true enforcement year versus that around the pseudo enforcement year
To conduct the second robustness test, we ﬁrst separate the countries into two groups. We refer to the countries that started
enforcing their insider trading laws within our sample period (i.e., from 1982 to 2003) as the treatment countries. We denote all
Table 4
The initial enforcement of insider trading laws and capital allocation efﬁciency: separating the developed and emerging markets.
Independent variable Developed market Emerging market Interaction model
(1) (2) (3)
ITENFk,t −0.047 0.024 −0.042
(−1.68) (0.46) (−1.61)
ITENFk,t × emerging market 0.083
(1.58)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t λ 0.336⁎⁎⁎ −0.201 0.317⁎⁎⁎
(4.43) (−1.20) (4.13)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t × Emerging Market λEM −0.462⁎⁎⁎
(−3.48)
Δqj,t−1 × SIZEi,t-1 −0.018⁎⁎⁎ −0.011 −0.015⁎⁎⁎
(−3.75) (−0.52) (−2.89)
Δqj,t−1 × MBi,t-1 0.028 0.115 0.029
(1.02) (1.60) (1.15)
Δqj,t−1 × GDPk,t 0.168 0.756⁎ 0.179
(0.96) (1.76) (0.97)
Δcfi,t−1 0.941⁎⁎⁎ 0.411⁎⁎ 0.878⁎⁎⁎
(10.34) (2.29) (8.10)
SIZEi,t−1 −0.004 −0.027⁎⁎⁎ −0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−1.62) (−5.17) (−2.91)
MBi,t−1 0.038⁎⁎⁎ 0.042⁎⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎
(3.29) (2.41) (4.46)
GDPk,t −0.445⁎⁎⁎ −0.163⁎⁎⁎ −0.373⁎⁎⁎
(−8.26) (−3.04) (−6.48)
Δqj,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.024 0.029
No. of Obs. 123,343 19,923 143,266
Hypothesis test λ(1) − λ(2) = 0 λ + λEM = 0
p-Value [0.003] [0.233]
Note: i, j, k, and t are subscripts for ﬁrm, industry, country, and year. The dependent variable is the investment growth rate,Δln(CAPXi,t).Δq is themean industry return
of US-listed ﬁrms.Δcf is the growth rate of operating cash ﬂows. SIZE isﬁrm size.MB is themarket-to-book ratio. GDP is the natural logarithmof per capita GDP. ITENF is
a dummyvariable that equals one in the years after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, and zero otherwise. EmergingMarket is a dummyvariable that equals
one for ﬁrms in the emergingmarkets, and zero otherwise. Industry ﬁxed effects are deﬁned based on Fama and French's (1997) 48-industry classiﬁcation. See Appen-
dix A for the detailed deﬁnitions of variables. No. of obs. is the number of ﬁrm-year observations. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard
errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 5
Robustness tests for the identiﬁcation strategy.
Panel A: The change in capital allocation efﬁciency around the enforcement year
Independent variable Coefﬁcient
(t-stat)
D[−2,0]k,t 0.041
(0.83)
D[+1,+3]k,t −0.028
(−0.84)
D[N + 3]k,t −0.033
(−0.74)Δqj,t−1 × D[−2,0]k,t λD[−2,0] −0.115
(−1.00)Δqj,t −1× D[+1,+3]k,t λD[+1,+3] 0.238**
(2.52)Δqj,t−1 × D[N + 3]k,t λD[N+3] 0.334***
(4.83)
Δqj,t−1 × SIZEi,t-1 −0.017***
(−3.94)
Δqj,t−1 × MBi,t-1 0.028
(0.99)
Δqj,t−1× GDPk,t 0.196
(1.07)
Δcfi,t−1 0.942***
(10.37)
SIZEi,t−1 −0.004
(−1.60)
MBi,t−1 0.038***
(3.18)
GDPk,t −0.453***
(−8.01)
Δqj,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year Yes
Fixed effects of country, industry, and year Yes
Adjusted R2 0.033
No. of Obs. 123,343
p-value for hypothesis testingλD[+1,+3] − λD[−2,0] = 0 [0.015]λD [N+3] − λD [+1,+3] = 0 [0.310]
Panel B: The change in capital allocation efﬁciency after the true enforcement year versus that after the pseudo enforcement year
Independent variable Mean coefﬁcient sig. + % sig.– %
(1) (2) (3)
TrueITENFk,t −0.044 0.000 0.001
PseudoITENFi,t 0.004 0.021 0.001Δqj,t−1 × TrueITENFk,t λTrue 0.323 1.000 0.000Δqj,t−1 × PseudoITENFi,t λPseudo −0.020 0.005 0.050
Δqj,t−1 × SIZEi,t−1 −0.018 0.000 1.000
Δqj,t−1 × MBi,t−1 0.028 0.000 0.000
Δqj,t−1 × GDPk,t 0.168 0.000 0.000
Δcfi,t−1 0.941 1.000 0.000
SIZEi,t−1 −0.004 0.000 0.000
MBi,t−1 0.038 1.000 0.000
GDPk,t −0.446 0.000 1.000
Δqj,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year Yes
Fixed effects of country, industry, and year Yes
Adjusted R2 0.033
No. of Obs. 123,343
Hypothesis testing
λTrue − λPseudo 0.343 1.000 0.000
Note: The sample includes only the developed markets. i, j, k, and t are subscripts for ﬁrm, industry, country, and year. The dependent variable is the investment growth
rate, Δln(CAPXi,t). Δq is themean industry return of US-listed ﬁrms. Δcf is the growth rate of operating cash ﬂows. SIZE is ﬁrm size.MB is the market-to-book ratio. GDP is
the natural logarithm of per capita GDP. D[−2,0] is a dummy variable that equals one for years [−2,0] around the enforcement year (i.e., year 0), and zero otherwise.
D[+1, +3] is a dummy variable that equals one for years [+1, +3] around the enforcement year, and zero otherwise. D[N + 3] is a dummy variable that equals one
for the period starting in year +4 and beyond, and zero otherwise. TrueITENF a dummy variable that equals one for the period after the true enforcement year, and
zero otherwise. PseudoITENF as a dummy variable that equals one for the period after the randomly assigned pseudo enforcement year, and zero otherwise. Industry
ﬁxed effects are deﬁned based on Fama and French's (1997) 48-industry classiﬁcation. See Appendix A for thedetailed deﬁnitions of variables. The t-statistics are reported
in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level. ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Panel B reports the summary statistics for 1000 regressions based on the 1000 independent samplings. Column (1) reports the mean coefﬁcient es-
timates of the 1000 replications. Columns (2) and (3) report theportions of the 1000 replications inwhich thecorresponding coefﬁcient estimates are respectively positive
and negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level.
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other countries as the control countries. We independently assign a random year as the pseudo enforcement year for each ﬁrm in the
control countries.19 For observations in the treatment country, we deﬁne TrueITENF as a dummy variable that equals one for the period
after the true enforcement year, and zero otherwise. TrueITENF is set to zero for all observations in the control countries. For observa-
tions in the control countries, we deﬁned PseudoITENF as a dummy variable that equals one for the period after the randomly assigned
pseudo enforcement year, and zero otherwise. PseudoITENF is set to zero for all observations in the treatment countries. We then
modify the baseline regression model by replacing ITENF with TrueITENF and PseudoITENF, and Δq × ITENF with Δq × TrueITENF and
Δq × PseudoITENF.
We repeat the random sampling 1000 times. The summary statistics for the 1000 regressions using the developed markets sample
are reported in Panel B of Table 5. Column (1) shows that themean coefﬁcient ofΔq × TrueITENF (λTrue) is 0.323, close to the coefﬁcient
of Δq × ITENF reported in Column (1) of Table 4 (0.336). In addition, Column (2) shows that λTrue is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5%
level in all 1000 regressions, and Column (3) shows that none of the 1000 regression produces a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient. The
mean coefﬁcient of Δq × PseudoITENF (λPseudo) is−0.020, which is close to zero. Moreover, only 5 out of the 1000 regressions show a
signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient of λPseudo, and 50 out of the 1000 regressions generate a signiﬁcant and negative coefﬁcient λPseudo.
The mean value of λTrue− λPseudo is 0.343, and a formal test shows that λTrue− λPseudo is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in all
1000 regressions.
4.4. Other robustness tests
We also conduct a battery of other sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our baseline results for the developed markets. The
results are reported in Table 6.
4.4.1. Alternative measures of investment and investment opportunities
We ﬁrst test whether our results are sensitive to alternativemeasures of capital investment or investment opportunity shocks. First,
we measure investment growth as the change in the logarithm of capital expenditures plus R&D expenditures, scaled by lagged total
assets (CAPXRD), or the change in the logarithm of one plus total assets growth (TAG).20 The results are reported in Columns (1) and
(2) of Table 6, and are not qualitatively changed. Second, wemeasure the investment opportunity shock as the change in the logarithm
of Tobin's Q in the previous year. The coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF is positive and signiﬁcant (coeff. = 0.264; t-stat = 4.12), as shown in
Column (3) of Table 6.
4.4.2. Further controls for other determinants of investment growth
Lang et al. (1996) ﬁnd a negative association between investment growth and leverage (LEV). Lamont (2000) ﬁnds that
investment growth is related to its lagged value. Wurgler (2000) documents a positive association between investment
elasticity to value added and ﬁnancial development (FD) (Beck et al., 2000). We thus check whether our baseline results
are robust to controlling for these variables. The results are reported in Column (4) of Table 6 and again are qualitatively
similar to the ﬁndings in Column (1) of Table 4.21 The coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF is 0.278 (t-stat = 2.39). Consistent with
the ﬁndings in prior literature (e.g., Wurgler, 2000) that ﬁnancial development facilitates efﬁcient resource allocation, the coefﬁcient
of Δq × FD is positive and signiﬁcant (coeff. = 0.310; t-stat = 3.18). Also consistent with Lang et al. (1996) and Lamont (2000),
investment growth is negatively associated with leverage (coeff. = −0.250; t-stat = −5.73) and lagged investment growth
(coeff. =−0.245; t-stat =−15.21).
4.4.3. Country-level analysis
We also repeat the analysis using country-year as the unit of observation. The tests are performed in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we
estimate the following regression models to obtain country-year-speciﬁc estimates of the sensitivity of investment growth to re-
turn.
Δ ln CAPXi;t
 
¼∑
k;t
βk;tμk;t þ∑
k;t
λk;tμk;t  Δqj;t−1 þ β2SIZEi;t−1 þ λ2Δqj;t−1  SIZEi;t−1þ
β3MBi;t−1 þ λ3Δqj;t−1 MBi;t−1 þ β4GDPk;t þ λ4Δqj;t−1  GDPk;t þ γΔcf i;t−1þ
∑
44
j¼1
ϕ jv j þ∑
44
j¼1
φ jv j  Δqj;t−1 þ εi;t :
ð5Þ
19 More speciﬁcally, we randomly pick a year from the list of true enforcement years (i.e., 1988, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1998) of the treatment coun-
tries for each ﬁrm in the control countries. Randomly picking a year from 1982 to 2003 does not change the inference.
20 Using the change in asset growth generates qualitatively similar results.
21 Wurgler (2000) uses averageﬁnancial development (FD) over a period of time.We have included countryﬁxed effects and their interactionswithΔq. Herewe con-
trol for the country-year-speciﬁc measure of FD. We do not include FD in our baseline regression because it could be endogenous to enforcement.
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Essentially, we replace ITENF and the country (μk) and year (wt) indictors and their interactions with Δq (Δq × ITENF, μk × Δq,
and wt × Δq) with country-year indictors (μk,t) and their interactions with Δq (μk,t × Δq). In this way, we obtain country-year-spe-
ciﬁc estimates of the sensitivity of investment growth to return (λ^k;t) after controlling for the effects of industry, ﬁrm size, market-
to-book ratios, and per capita GDP on sensitivity.22 In the second step, we regress λ^k;ton ITENF and control for country and year
ﬁxed effects.
λ^k;t ¼ η1ITENFk;t þ∑
k
ωkμk þ∑
t
θtwt þ εk;t : ð6Þ
22 We choose this speciﬁcation so thatwe could retain a sufﬁcient degree of freedom to control for the variation in the sensitivity of investment growth to returnacross
industries and time-varying ﬁrm (SIZE, MB) and country-level (GDP) characteristics. Alternatively, we estimate the sensitivity of investment growth to return by
regressing ΔlnCAPX on Δq and Δcf for each country-year with at least 20 observations. The results (unreported) are qualitatively similar.
Table 6
Additional robustness tests for the effect of the initial enforcement of insider trading laws on capital allocation efﬁciency in the developed markets.
Independent variable Investment growth
deﬁned as
Δln(CAPXRDi,t)
Investment growth
deﬁned as
Δln(TAGi,t)
Δqmeasured as
change in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc lnQ
Further controlling
for lagged Δln(CAPX),
LEV, FD, and Δq × FD
Country-level analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ITENFk,t −0.046⁎ −0.020⁎ −0.011 −0.061 0.205⁎⁎
(−1.80) (−1.79) (−0.53) (−1.31) (2.01)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t 0.287⁎⁎⁎ 0.070⁎⁎ 0.264⁎⁎⁎ 0.278⁎⁎
(4.60) (2.32) (4.12) (2.39)
Δqj,t−1 × SIZEi,t-1 −0.022⁎⁎⁎ −0.002 0.024⁎⁎⁎ −0.011⁎⁎⁎
(−3.79) (−1.69) (2.16) (−3.16)
Δqj,t−1 × MBi,t-1 0.018 0.023 −0.082⁎⁎⁎ −0.008
(0.73) (0.87) (−4.44) (−0.39)
Δqj,t−1 × GDPk,t −0.015 −0.058 0.393⁎⁎⁎ −0.312
(−0.09) (−0.53) (2.82) (−1.69)
Δqj,t−1 × FDk,t 0.310⁎⁎⁎
(3.18)
Δcfi,t−1 0.647⁎⁎⁎ −0.278⁎⁎⁎ 0.767⁎⁎⁎ 1.182⁎⁎⁎
(18.66) (−5.42) (7.55) (22.24)
SIZEi,t−1 −0.006⁎⁎⁎ −0.007⁎⁎⁎ −0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.002
(−3.67) (−5.59) (−3.56) (0.36)
MBi,t−1 0.041⁎⁎⁎ 0.017⁎⁎ −0.015⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎
(3.47) (2.79) (−3.03) (4.48)
GDPk,t −0.424⁎⁎⁎ −0.280⁎⁎⁎ −0.415⁎⁎⁎ −0.596⁎⁎⁎
(−8.63) (−7.92) (−10.32) (−7.83)
FDk,t 0.041
(1.36)
LEVi,t−1 −0.250⁎⁎⁎
(−5.73)
Δln(CAPXi,t-1) −0.245⁎⁎⁎
(−15.21)
Δq j,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of
country, industry, and year
Yes Yes Yes Yes n/a
Fixed effects of country,
industry, and year
Yes Yes Yes Yes Country and year
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.099 0.051 0.099 0.068
No. of Obs. 123,343 123,343 117,007 93,965 410
Note: i, j, k, and t are subscripts for ﬁrm, industry, country, and year. Columns (1) and (2) repeat the baseline regression and replace the dependent
variables with Δln(CAPXRD) and Δln(TAG), respectively. Column (3) repeats the baseline regression and replaces Δq with the change in the logarithm
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc Tobin's Q. Column (4) augments the baseline regression with lagged Δln(CAPX), LEV, FD, and Δq × FD. The dependent variable in
Column (5) is the country-year-speciﬁc measure of capital allocation efﬁciency (λk,t) estimated from the following regression:
Δ ln ðCAPXi;tÞ ¼∑
k;t
βk;tμk;t þ∑
k;t
λk;tμk;t  Δqj;t−1 þ β2SIZEi;t−1 þ λ2SIZEi;t−1  Δqj;t−1 þ β3MBi;t−1 þ λ3MBi;t−1  Δqj;t−1þ
β4GDPk;t þ λ4GDPk;t  Δqj;t−1 þ γΔcf i;t−1 þ∑44j¼1 ϕ jv j þ∑44j¼1 φ jv j  Δqj;t−1 þ εi;t ;
where Δq is the mean industry return of US-listed ﬁrms except in Column (3). Δcf is the growth rate of operating cash ﬂows. SIZE is ﬁrm size. MB is the market-to-
book ratio. GDP is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP. ITENF is a dummy variable that equals one in the years after the initial enforcement of insider trading
laws, and zero otherwise. vj and μk,t are indicators for industry and country-year, respectively. See Appendix A for the detailed variable deﬁnitions. The t-statistics
are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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The results are reported in Column (5) of Table 6. The results are less signiﬁcant than those obtained in the ﬁrm-level analysis but
the inference is qualitatively similar. The coefﬁcient of ITENF is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (coeff. = 0.205; t-stat = 2.01).23
4.4.4. Are the results sensitive to speciﬁc countries or years?
Finally, we test whether the results are sensitive to exclusion of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis period (1997–1998). The results
(untabulated) are qualitatively the same as those of our baseline regression.We also test whether our results are driven by any speciﬁc
country by repeating our baseline regression for the developed markets 23 times, dropping one country each time. The results
(untabulated) show that the coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF is signiﬁcantly positive in all 23 regressions.
5. Cross-sectional variation in the effect of enforcement
To further substantiate our hypothesis, we examine the cross-sectional variation in the effect of enforcement on the sensitivity of
investment growth to return in the developed markets. Finding empirical results consistent with the theoretical prediction would fur-
ther reduce concerns about whether our baseline results are simply driven by omitted variables. Furthermore, these cross-sectional
tests help highlight the mechanisms through which enforcement improves capital allocation efﬁciency.
5.1. The change in liquidity around the enforcement year (H2a)
If enforcement improves capital allocation efﬁciency by increasing the information efﬁciency of stock prices, the increase in the sen-
sitivity of investment growth to return should be positively associated with the change in price informativeness around the enforce-
ment year. We use liquidity as a proxy for price informativeness. Prior literature has suggested that restricting insider trading
increases the liquidity of stock markets (Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1991). Increased liquidity attracts informed investors and enhances
price efﬁciency (Admati and Pﬂeiderer, 1988; Chordia et al., 2008). Following Amihud et al. (2015), we measure liquidity inversely
using Amihud's (2002)measure of illiquidity (ILLIQ). This measure captures the daily price response associatedwith one dollar of trad-
ing volume, and thus serves as a rough proxy for the price impact in Kyle (1985). Fong et al. (2014) ﬁnd that ILLIQ is highly correlated
with the Kyle's price impact measure.
We compute Amihud's (2002)measure of illiquidity over the two years before (i.e., years−2 and−1, denoted as ILLIQ[−2,−1]) and
after (i.e., years +1 and +2, denoted as ILLIQ[+1,+2]) the enforcement year. We calculate the relative change in ILLIQ around the en-
forcement year as ILLIQ[+1,+2]/ILLIQ[−2,−1]. To reduce skewness, we deﬁne the change in liquidity around the enforcement year
(ΔLIQUID) asminus onemultiplied by the natural logarithmof ILLIQ[+1,+2]/ILLIQ[−2,−1]. See Appendix A for the detailed deﬁnition. Con-
sistent with the notion that enforcement enhances liquidity and ﬁndings in prior studies (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Fernandes
and Ferreira, 2009), Table 2 shows that the mean and median of ΔLIQUID are positive.
We then interact ΔLIQUIDwith ITENF and Δq × ITENF in the baseline model.24 The regression results are reported in Table 7. Since
we require the ﬁrms in the treatment countries to have both pre-enforcement and post-enforcement observations in the test, the sam-
ple size is reduced to 91,246. The coefﬁcient ofΔq× ITENF×ΔLIQUID for thedevelopedmarkets is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level
(coeff. = 0.075; t-stat = 2.70). The evidence lends support to H2a.
5.2. Earnings opacity before enforcement (H2b)
We consider several earnings attributes employed in prior studies to measure information environment opacity (Leuz et al., 2003;
Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006). More speciﬁcally, for each country-year, we follow Leuz et al. (2003) and
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) to measure (1) the tendency of ﬁrms to avoid small losses (AVOID); (2) earnings aggressiveness (AGGR),
(3) earnings smoothness (SMOOTH), and (4) discretion in reported earnings (DISC). We then convert the four country-year individual
measures into decile ranks within our sample. We deﬁne earnings opacity for each country-year as the mean ranks across the decile
ranks of the four individual earnings attributes. The opacity of information environments before enforcement (OPACITY) is measured
as the average earnings opacity for each treatment country over years−3 to−1 before the enforcement year. See Appendix A for
the detailed deﬁnition.
We then interact OPACITYwith ITENF and Δq × ITENF in the baseline model. The regression results are reported in Table 8. The re-
sults are consistent with our prediction. The coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF × OPACITY is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level (coeff. =
0.071; t-stat = 3.22). The results are consistent with H2b that the effect of enforcement is more pronounced for countries with
more opaque information environments before enforcement.
23 We also estimate aweighted least squares (WLS) regression anduse the inverse of the square of the standard error of λ^k;t from theﬁrst-step regression as theweight
(King, 1997). The results (unreported) are qualitatively similar.
24 We only compute ΔLIQUID for observations in the treatment countries, i.e., the countries whose enforcement occurred within our sample period (from 1982 to
2003). For observations in other countries, we set ΔLIQUID to zero.
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5.3. Product market competition (H3)
H3 predicts a more pronounced effect of enforcement on capital allocation efﬁciency for ﬁrms operating in more compet-
itive product markets. We measure competition in product markets by the Herﬁndahl index of sales for each country, 2-digit
SIC industry, and year.25 We then partition the sample into three groups of equal size for each country-year based on the
Herﬁndahl index. We test H3 by estimating the baseline regression within each group and comparing the coefﬁcient of Δq
× ITENF across groups.
The results are reported in Table 9. The coefﬁcients ofΔq× ITENF appear to declinemonotonically as the Herﬁndahl index increases.
The largest coefﬁcient ofΔq× ITENF (coeff.= 0.562; t-stat= 6.39) is observed inﬁrms operating in themost competitivemarkets (i.e.,
thosewith the lowestHerﬁndahl index), and the smallest coefﬁcient (coeff.= 0.316; t-stat= 3.14) is observed in the least competitive
industries (i.e., those with the highest Herﬁndahl index). For ﬁrms with a medium Herﬁndahl index, the coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF also
lies in between (coeff. = 0.360; t-stat = 3.75). A formal test shows that the difference in Δq × ITENF between themost and least com-
petitive industries is signiﬁcant at the 10% level (p-value= 0.0761). This evidence supports the notion that enforcement improves cap-
ital allocation efﬁciency by providing information to guide managers' decision-making.
25 We also use US data to compute the Herﬁndahl index and the results are qualitatively similar.
Table 7
Mechanism test: association between the change in liquidity around the enforcement year and the
change in capital allocation efﬁciency after enforcement in the developed markets.
Independent variable Coefﬁcient
(t-stat)
ITENFk,t −0.005
(−0.19)
ITENFk,t × ΔLIQUIDi −0.004
(−0.63)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t 0.261⁎⁎
(2.73)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t × ΔLIQUIDi 0.075⁎⁎
(2.70)
Δqj,t−1 × SIZEi,t−1 −0.020⁎⁎⁎
(−7.30)
Δqj,t−1 × MBi,t−1 0.015
(0.59)
Δqj,t −1× GDPk,t 0.321
(1.68)
Δcfi,t−1 0.978⁎⁎⁎
(11.60)
SIZEi,t−1 −0.005⁎⁎
(−2.79)
MBi,t−1 0.044⁎⁎⁎
(5.09)
GDPk,t −0.448⁎⁎⁎
(−5.48)
Δqj,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year Yes
Fixed effects of country, industry, and year Yes
Adjusted R2 0.040
No. of obs. 91,246
Note: i, j, k, and t are subscripts for ﬁrm, industry, country, and year. The dependent variable is the invest-
ment growth rate, Δln(CAPXi,t).Δq is themean industry return of US-listed ﬁrms. Δcf is the growth rate of
operating cash ﬂows. SIZE is ﬁrm size.MB is the market-to-book ratio. GDP is the natural logarithm of per
capita GDP. ITENF is a dummy variable that equals one in the years after the initial enforcement of insider
trading laws, and zero otherwise. Industryﬁxed effects are deﬁnedbased on FamaandFrench's (1997) 48-
industry classiﬁcation. ΔLIQUIDi is the change in liquidity between years [−2,−1] and [+1, +2] for the
ﬁrms in countries whose enforcement occurred within our sample period (i.e., from 1982 to 2003). For
ﬁrms in other countries, ΔLIQUID is set as zero. See Appendix A for the detailed deﬁnitions of variables.
No. of Obs. is the number of ﬁrm-year observations. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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5.4. Financing constraints (H4)
If enforcement improves capital allocation efﬁciency by relaxing ﬁnancing constraints, then the effect is expected to be more pro-
nounced in ﬁrms with a higher level of ﬁnancial constraints. We measure ﬁnancial constraints by the Whited and Wu (2006) index
(WW index for short).26We separate ﬁrms into three groups of equal size for each country-year.We then estimate the baseline regres-
sion within each group and compare the coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF across groups.
The results are reported in Table 10 and are consistentwith H4. The coefﬁcients ofΔq× ITENFmonotonically increasewith theWW
index. The coefﬁcient is 0.207 (t-stat = 2.37) for ﬁrms with the lowest WW index (least constrained), and is 0.453 (t-stat = 5.01) for
ﬁrms with the highest WW index (most constrained). The coefﬁcient lies in between (coeff. = 0.329; t-stat = 3.63) for ﬁrms with a
medium WW index. The difference in the coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF between the highest and lowest WW index groups is signiﬁcant
at the 1% level (p-value = 0.005).
5.5. Agency problems (H5)
If enforcement improves capital allocation efﬁciency also by mitigating agency problems, we would expect to ﬁnd a more
pronounced increase in the sensitivity of investment growth to return after enforcement for ﬁrms with more severe agency
conﬂicts between insiders and outside shareholders. We measure the agency problem by the wedge (WEDGE) between the
control rights and cash ﬂow rights of the controlling shareholder.27 We partition the sample into two groups based on
26 We also use amodiﬁed SA index developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), i.e. the HP index, and the KZ index developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) tomeasure
ﬁnancial constraints. We obtain qualitatively the same results using the HP index. When we use the KZ index, we continue to ﬁnd a higher coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF in
the highest KZ group than in the lowest KZ group, although the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
27 The data are obtained from Claessens et al. (2002) and Faccio and Lang (2002). We assume thatWEDGE does not change over our sample period.
Table 8
Earnings opacity and the change in capital allocation efﬁciency after the initial enforcement of insider trad-
ing laws in the developed markets.
Independent variable Coefﬁcient
(t-stat)
ITENFk,t 0.025
(0.43)
ITENFk,t−1 × OPACITYk −0.013
(−1.32)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t −0.051
(−0.37)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t × OPACITYk 0.071⁎⁎⁎
(3.22)
Δqj,t−1 × SIZEi,t−1 −0.017⁎⁎⁎
(−3.68)
Δqj,t−1 × MBi,t−1 0.030
(1.07)
Δqj,t−1 × GDPk,t−1 0.157
(0.88)
Δcfi,t–1 0.942⁎⁎⁎
(10.38)
SIZEi,t−1 −0.004
(−1.70)
MBi,t−1 0.037⁎⁎⁎
(3.12)
GDPk,t−1 −0.444⁎⁎⁎
(−8.30)
Δqj,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year Yes
Fixed effects of country, industry, and year Yes
Adjusted R2 0.033
No. of Obs. 123,343
Note: i, j, k, and t are subscripts for ﬁrm, industry, country, and year. The dependent variable is the invest-
ment growth rate, Δln(CAPXi,t). Δq is the mean industry return of US-listed ﬁrms. Δcf is the growth rate of
operating cash ﬂows. SIZE is ﬁrm size.MB is the market-to-book ratio. GDP is the natural logarithm of per
capita GDP. ITENF is a dummy variable that equals one in the years after the initial enforcement of insider
trading laws, and zero otherwise. Industry ﬁxed effects are deﬁned based on Fama and French's (1997)
48-industry classiﬁcation. For observations in countrieswhose enforcement occurredwithin our sample pe-
riod (i.e., from 1982 to 2003),OPACITY is deﬁned as earnings opacity before the enforcement year. For other
countries, OPACITY is set as zero. See Appendix A for the detailed deﬁnitions of variables. No. of Obs. is the
number ofﬁrm-year observations. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard er-
rors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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WEDGE. The ﬁrst group includes all ﬁrms with aWEDGE less than or equal to zero, and the second group contains all ﬁrms with
a positiveWEDGE. Firms whose shares are widely held are placed in the ﬁrst group. The existing literature suggests that ﬁrms
with a positiveWEDGE have higher incentives to expropriate minority shareholders and hence have more severe agency prob-
lems (Claessens et al., 2002). Firms with a positiveWEDGE are also more ﬁnancially constrained (Lin et al., 2011). We then es-
timate the baseline regression separately for these two groups and compare the coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF. We predict a larger
coefﬁcient of Δq × ITENF for ﬁrms with a positive WEDGE.
The results are reported in Table 11 and are also consistent with our prediction. The regressions are estimatedwith all ﬁrm-year ob-
servations in the developed markets that haveWEDGE data. For ﬁrms with zeroWEDGE, we ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant positive coefﬁcient of
Δq× ITENF (coeff.= 0.187; t-stat= 1.35). Forﬁrmswith a positiveWEDGE, the coefﬁcient ofΔq× ITENF is greater andmore signiﬁcant
(coeff. = 0.522; t-stat = 4.54). A formal test shows that the difference in the two coefﬁcient estimates is statistically signiﬁcant (p-
value = 0.006). The evidence supports H5.
To summarize, the evidence presented in Tables 7 to 11 is consistent with the notion that enforcement improves capital allocation
efﬁciency by enhancing price efﬁciency. This in turn providesmore precise information to guidemanagerial decisions, relaxes ﬁnancing
constraints and alleviates agency problems.
6. Enforcement and future accounting performance
If the increase in the sensitivity of investment growth to return after enforcement reﬂects improved capital allocation efﬁciency, fu-
ture operating performance should also improve after enforcement. In addition, this improvement should be positively correlatedwith
the increase in sensitivity. We thus employ the following regression model to investigate the effect of enforcement on ﬁrm operating
performance:
ROAi;tþ1 ¼ a1ITENFk;t−1 þ a2ITENFk;t−1  ΔEFFICIENCYk þ b1lnSALEi;t
þ b2MBi;t þ b3WWi;t þ b4HERF j;k;t þ μk þ vj þwt þ εi;tþ1;
ð7Þ
Table 9
Product market competition and the change in capital allocation efﬁciency after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws in the developed markets.
Partitioning by the Herﬁndahl index (HERF)
Independent variable Low
(Most competitive)
(1)
Medium
(2)
High
(Least competitive)
(3)
ITENFk,t −0.090⁎⁎⁎ −0.057 −0.032
(−5.17) (−1.15) (−1.02)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t λ 0.562⁎⁎⁎ 0.360⁎⁎⁎ 0.316⁎⁎⁎
(6.39) (3.75) (3.14)
Δqj,t−1 × SIZEi,t−1 −0.009⁎⁎ −0.033⁎⁎⁎ −0.010
(−3.03) (−3.50) (−0.71)
Δqj,t−1 × MBi,t−1 0.025 −0.027 0.079
(1.74) (−0.48) (1.50)
Δqj,t−1 × GDPk,t−1 0.476⁎⁎ −0.073 0.234
(3.14) (−0.41) (0.84)
Δcfi,t−1 0.957⁎⁎⁎ 0.955⁎⁎⁎ 0.881⁎⁎⁎
(34.74) (4.04) (17.41)
SIZEi,t−1 −0.006 0.001 −0.004⁎
(−1.76) (0.33) (−2.01)
MBi,t−1 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.040⁎⁎ 0.018
(8.40) (2.45) (1.59)
GDPk,t−1 −0.667⁎⁎⁎ −0.330⁎⁎⁎ −0.450⁎⁎⁎
(−6.72) (−6.75) (−6.01)
Δqj,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.039 0.032
No. of Obs. 40,824 40,684 41,045
Hypothesis testing λ(1) − λ(3) = 0
p-Value [0.076]
Note: i, j, k, and t are subscripts for ﬁrm, industry, country, and year. The dependent variable is the investment growth rate,Δln(CAPXi,t).Δq is themean industry return of
US-listed ﬁrms. Δcf is the growth rate of operating cash ﬂows. SIZE is ﬁrm size.MB is the market-to-book ratio. GDP is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP. ITENF is a
dummy variable that equals one in the years after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, and zero otherwise. Industry ﬁxed effects are deﬁned based on Fama and
French's (1997) 48-industry classiﬁcation. HERF is the Herﬁndahl index of sales. A low value of HERFmeans more competitive product markets. See Appendix A for the
detailed deﬁnitions of variables. No. of Obs. is the number of ﬁrm-year observations. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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where subscripts k, j, i, and t are indicators for country, industry, ﬁrm, and year, respectively; and μk, vj, and wt are country, in-
dustry, and year ﬁxed effects, respectively. ROA is return on assets, measured as operating income scaled by lagged total assets.
lnSALE is the natural logarithm of sales revenue, WW is the Whited and Wu (2006) index of ﬁnancial constraints, MB is the mar-
ket-to-book ratio, and HERF is the Herﬁndahl index. ΔEFFICIENCYk is the incremental change in the sensitivity of investment
growth to return after enforcement for country k. We measure ΔEFFICIENCY as the estimate of λk∗ from the following regres-
sion28:
Δ ln CAPXi;t
 
¼∑
26
k¼1
βkμk  ITENFk;t−1 þ∑
26
k¼1
λkμk  Δqj;t−1  ITENFk;t−1 þ β2SIZEi;t−1þ
λ2SIZEi;t−1  Δqj;t−1 þ β3MBi;t−1 þ λ3MBi;t−1  Δqj;t−1 þ β4GDPk;t þ λ4GDPk;t  Δqj;t−1 þ γΔcf i;t−1
þ∑
45
k¼1
ϖkμk þ∑
45
k¼1
ωkμk  Δqj;t−1 þ∑
44
j¼1
ϕ jv j þ∑
44
j¼1
φ jv j  Δqj;t−1 þ ∑
2003
t¼1982
ϑtwt þ ∑
2003
t¼1982
θtwt  Δqj;t−1 þ εi;t :
ð8Þ
Regression (7) is estimated using observations in the developed markets and the results are reported in Table 12. Column
(1) does not include the interaction term ITENF × ΔEFFICIENCY and shows a signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient of ITENF
(coeff. = 0.019; t-stat = 2.55). This result suggests that on average accounting performance improves after enforcement in
the developed markets. In Column (2), we interact ITENF with ΔEFFICIENCY. The coefﬁcient of ITENF × ΔEFFICIENCY is positive
and signiﬁcant (coeff. = 0.058; t-stat = 2.59). This result suggests that the degree of improvement in accounting performance
28 Eq. (8) is derived from Eq. (4) bymultiplying the indicator for the 26 treatment countries to ITENF andΔq× ITENF. AsΔEFFICIENCY is estimated for each country and
we have included the country ﬁxed effect in Regression (7), we do not include ΔEFFICIENCY per se in the regression.
Table 10
Financing constraints and the change in capital allocation efﬁciency after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws in the developed markets.
Partitioning by the WW index
Independent variable Low (Least constrained)
(1)
Medium
(2)
High (Most constrained)
(3)
ITENFk,t −0.027 −0.046⁎ −0.074⁎⁎
(−0.89) (−1.81) (−2.14)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t λ 0.207⁎⁎ 0.329⁎⁎⁎ 0.453⁎⁎⁎
(2.37) (3.63) (5.01)
Δqj,t−1 × SIZEi,t−1 −0.018 −0.007 −0.014
(−1.30) (−0.47) (−0.42)
Δqj,t−1 × MBi,t−1 0.005 0.031 0.041
(0.16) (0.49) (1.15)
Δqj,t−1 × GDPk,t−1 0.232 −0.043 0.268
(1.26) (−0.25) (1.15)
Δcfi,t−1 0.437⁎⁎⁎ 0.935⁎⁎⁎ 1.069⁎⁎⁎
(3.25) (7.96) (14.73)
SIZEi,t−1 0.002 −0.005 −0.026⁎⁎⁎
(0.92) (−0.87) (−3.52)
MBi,t−1 0.079⁎⁎⁎ 0.033 0.019⁎⁎
(8.18) (1.37) (2.43)
GDPk,t−1 −0.429⁎⁎⁎ −0.454⁎⁎⁎ −0.434⁎⁎⁎
(−7.22) (−8.48) (−5.70)
Δqj,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.032 0.034
No. of Obs. 40,391 40,227 40,549
Hypothesis testing λ(3) − λ(1) = 0
p-Value [0.005]
Note: i, j, k, and t are subscripts for ﬁrm, industry, country, and year. The dependent variable is the investment growth rate,Δln(CAPXi,t).Δq is themean industry return of
US-listed ﬁrms. Δcf is the growth rate of operating cash ﬂows. SIZE is ﬁrm size.MB is the market-to-book ratio. GDP is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP. ITENF is a
dummy variable that equals one in the years after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, and zero otherwise. Industry ﬁxed effects are deﬁned based on Fama and
French's (1997) 48-industry classiﬁcation. TheWW index is theWhited andWu (2006) index of ﬁnancial constraints. A higher index implies tighter ﬁnancial constraints.
See Appendix A for the detailed deﬁnitions of variables. No. of Obs. is the number of ﬁrm-year observations. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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after enforcement is positively associated with the degree of improvement in capital allocation efﬁciency.29 This evidence fur-
ther supports our hypothesis that enforcement improves capital allocation efﬁciency.
7. Conclusion
We hypothesize that the initial enforcement of insider trading laws enhances capital allocation efﬁciency by increasing
the information efﬁciency of prices, which expands the information available for managers to make decisions, relaxes ﬁnanc-
ing constraints, and alleviate agency problems. Based on a difference-in-differences approach, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase
in the efﬁciency of capital allocation, as measured by the sensitivity of investment growth to lagged industry returns of US-
listed ﬁrms, after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws. The increase in capital allocation efﬁciency after enforce-
ment is concentrated in the developed markets, however, and is not signiﬁcant in the emerging markets. The changes in
the sensitivity of investment growth to return also occur shortly after the enforcement year.
Cross-sectional analysis on the developed markets shows that the improvement in capital allocation efﬁciency is positively associ-
atedwith the increase in price efﬁciency around the enforcement year asmeasured by the increase in liquidity around the that year. The
improvement is also more pronounced for countries with more opaque information environments before enforcement (i.e., where the
beneﬁt of the increase in price efﬁciency is larger).
Further analysis demonstrates that the improvement in capital allocation efﬁciency ismore pronounced for ﬁrms operating inmore
competitive productmarkets, ﬁrms that aremore ﬁnancially constrained, and ﬁrmswithmore severe agency problems. Finally, we also
ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms in the developedmarkets have better accounting performance after enforcement, and the increase in account-
ing performance is positively associated with the improvement in capital allocation efﬁciency.
Overall, our evidence supports the hypothesis that the initial enforcement of insider trading laws improves capital resource allocation
efﬁciency.
29 Alternatively, we use rank of ΔEFFICIENCY and ﬁnd qualitatively similar results (unreported).
Table 11
Agency problem and the change in capital allocation efﬁciency after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws in the developed markets.
Partitioning by WEDGE
Independent variable Wedge b =0
(1)
Wedge N 0
(2)
ITENFk,t −0.085⁎⁎ −0.096⁎⁎
(−2.36) (−2.69)Δqj,t−1 × ITENFk,t λ 0.187 0.522⁎⁎⁎
(1.35) (4.54)
Δqj,t−1 × SIZEi,t−1 0.023⁎⁎ −0.004
(2.37) (−0.39)
Δqj,t−1 × MBi,t−1 0.001 −0.021
(0.01) (−0.20)
Δqj,t−1 × GDPk,t−1 −0.882⁎⁎ −0.540
(−2.42) (−1.43)
Δcfi,t−1 0.776⁎⁎⁎ 0.801⁎⁎⁎
(6.82) (7.92)
SIZEi,t−1 −0.006⁎⁎⁎ −0.008⁎
(−3.70) (−2.08)
MBi,t−1 0.034⁎⁎ 0.059⁎⁎⁎
(2.85) (6.64)
GDPk,t−1 −0.376⁎⁎⁎ −0.493⁎⁎⁎
(−4.41) (−4.82)
Δqj,t−1 × ﬁxed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes
Fixed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.040
No. of Obs. 18,112 13,273
Hypothesis testing λ(1) − λ(2) = 0
p-Value [0.006]
Note: i, j, k, and t are subscripts for ﬁrm, industry, country, and year. The dependent variable is the investment growth rate,Δln(CAPXi,t).Δq is themean industry return of
US-listed ﬁrms. Δcf is the growth rate of operating cash ﬂows. SIZE is ﬁrm size.MB is the market-to-book ratio. GDP is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP. ITENF is a
dummy variable that equals one in the years after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, and zero otherwise. Industry ﬁxed effects are deﬁned based on Fama and
French's (1997) 48-industry classiﬁcation.WEDGE is the wedge between the voting rights and cash ﬂow rights of the largest shareholder. See Appendix A for the detailed
deﬁnitions of variables. No. of Obs. is the number of ﬁrm-year observations. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the country level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level
⁎⁎⁎ Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%
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Appendix A. Variable deﬁnitions
Variable
name
Deﬁnition Source
Country-level variables
ITENF Dummy variable that equals one for the years after the year of initial enforcement of insider trading laws,
and zero otherwise.
Bhattacharya and Daouk
(2002)
ITEXIST Dummy variable that equals one for the years after the year when insider trading laws were ﬁrst instituted,
and zero otherwise.
Bhattacharya and Daouk
(2002)
GOODGOV An index that measures the extent to which a country's government respects private property rights,
deﬁned as the sum of (1) government corruption, (2) the risk that the government will expropriate private
property, and (3) the risk that the government will repudiate contracts. A low value of GOODGOV indicates
less respect for private property rights and higher risk of expropriation by the government.
La Porta et al. (1998)
OPACITY Composite earnings opacity index based on four individual earnings attributes used in Leuz et al. (2003),
Bhattacharya et al. (2003), and Burgstahler et al. (2006). For each country-year in our sample period (i.e., from
1982 to 2003), we compute the following four individual earnings attributes: (1) earnings smoothing (SMOOTH),
(2) earnings aggressiveness (AGGR), (3) loss avoidance (AVOID), and (4) earnings discretion (DISC).
Worldscope
SMOOTH = minus one times corr(ΔACCR, ΔCFO)
AGGR = median of ACCR;
AVOID = (#small_pos − #small_neg) / (#small_pos + #small_neg);
DISC = median of |ACCR|/|CFO|,
where ACCR is accruals scaled by lagged total assets. Accruals is deﬁned as the change in non-cash working
capital plus the change in short-term debt (set to zero if missing) in the current liabilities and the change in
income tax payable (set to zero if missing), minus depreciation. CFO is operating cash ﬂows scaled by lagged
assets, deﬁned as operating income scaled by lagged assets, minus ACCR. ΔACCR and ΔCFO are the change in
ACCR and the change in CFO, respectively. Corr(ΔACCR, ΔCFO) is cross-sectional correlation between ΔACCR
and ΔCFO within each country-year. #small_pos (#small_neg) is the number of ﬁrms with small positive
(negative) earnings. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as having small positive (negative) earnings if its net income scaled by
(continued on next page)
Table 12
The change in ﬁrm accounting performance after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws in the developed markets.
Independent variable (1) (2)
ITENFk,t 0.019⁎⁎ −0.003
(2.55) (−0.29)
ITENFk,t × ΔEFFICIENCYk 0.058⁎⁎
(2.59)
lnSALEi,t −0.012⁎⁎⁎ −0.012⁎⁎⁎
(−3.33) (−3.32)
MBi,t 0.080⁎⁎⁎ 0.080⁎⁎⁎
(9.34) (9.59)
WWi,t −0.384⁎⁎⁎ −0.383⁎⁎⁎
(−9.51) (−9.51)
HERFk,j,t −0.001 −0.001
(−0.27) (−0.24)
Fixed effects of country, industry, and year Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.303
No. of Obs. 117,120 116,564
Note: i, j,k, and tare subscripts forﬁrm, industry, country, andyear. Thedependentvariable in the regressions isROAi,t+1. lnSALE is the logarithmof sales.MB is themarket-to-book
ratio.WW is theWhited andWu (2006) index of ﬁnancial constraints.HERF is the Herﬁndahl index of sales.ΔEFFICIENCYk is the estimate of the effect of enforcement on capital
allocation efﬁciency forﬁrms in country k (k = 1to26 for the 26 countrieswhose initial enforcement of insider trading laws occurredbetween1982 and2003), i.e., the estimate
of coefﬁcient λk∗ in the following regression:
Δ ln CAPXi;t
  ¼∑26
k¼1
βkμk  ITENFk;t þ∑
26
k¼1
λkμk  Δqj;t−1  ITENFk;t þ β2SIZEi;t−1 þ λ2SIZEi;t−1  Δq j;t−1 þ β3MBi;t−1þ
λ3MBi;t−1  Δqj;t−1 þ β4GDPk;t þ λ4GDPk;t  Δqj;t−1 þ γΔcf i;t−1 þ∑
45
k¼1
ϖkμk þ∑
45
k¼1
ωkμk  Δqj;t−1þ
∑
44
j¼1
ϕ jv j þ∑
44
j¼1
φ jv j  Δqj;t−1 þ ∑
2003
t¼1982
ϑtwt þ ∑
2003
t¼1982
θtwt  Δqj;t−1 þ εi;t ;
where μk, vj, and wt are dummy variables for country, industry, and year. Δq is the mean industry return of US-listed ﬁrms. Δcf is the growth rate of operating cash
ﬂows. SIZE is ﬁrm size. MB is the market-to-book ratio. GDP is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP. ITENF is a dummy variable that equals one in the years after
the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, and zero otherwise. Industry ﬁxed effects are deﬁned based on Fama and French's (1997) 48-industry classiﬁcation.
See Appendix A for the detailed deﬁnitions of variables. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and clustering at the country level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
707Z. Chen et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 45 (2017) 687–709
(continued)
Variable
name
Deﬁnition Source
lagged assets is within the range [0, 0.01] ([−0.01, 0]). We require at least 30 observations to compute the
four earnings attributes for each country-year.
We convert SMOOTH, AGGR, AVOID, and DISC into decile ranks. We deﬁne the aggregate earnings opacity
measure for each country-year as the average value of the decile ranks of SMOOTH, AGGR, AVOID, and DISC.
We deﬁne OPACITY for each treatment country (i.e., countries whose enforcement occurred between 1982
and 2003) as the mean aggregate earnings opacity measure over the three years (i.e., [−3,−1]) before the
enforcement year. We set OPACITY to zero for other countries.
FD The ﬁnancial development index for a country-year observation, deﬁned as the sum of stock market
capitalization to GDP and private and nonﬁnancial public domestic credit to GDP.
Beck et al. (2000)
GDP Natural logarithm of per capita GDP (in US$) for each country-year observation. World bank
Industry-level variables
Δq Natural logarithm of one plus the mean return of all US-listed ﬁrms in the same industry in year t. Industry is
deﬁned based on Fama and French's (1997) 48-industry classiﬁcation.
CRSP
HERF Herﬁndahl index, deﬁned as the sum of squares of the share of sales revenue of all ﬁrms in each two-digit
industry, each year and each country. We require at least three ﬁrms in each country, industry, and year to
compute the Herﬁndahl index.
Worldscope
Firm-level variables
Δln(CAPX) Investment growth rate, measured as the change in the natural logarithm of capital expenditures scaled by
lagged total assets.
Worldscope
Δln(CAPXRD) Change in the natural logarithm of capital expenditures plus R&D expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets. Worldscope
Δln(TAG) Change in the natural logarithm of one plus the change in total assets, scaled by lagged total assets. Worldscope
ΔLIQUID Change in liquidity around the enforcement year. We follow Amihud et al. (2015) to compute Amihud's
(2002) measure of illiquidity (ILLIQ) during the two years before (i.e., [−2,-1]) and two years after (i.e.,
[+1,+2]) the enforcement year.
ILLIQ i;t ¼ 1Ni;t ∑d
∣ri;d;t ∣
VOLi;d;t
, where Ni,t is the number of trading days with volume data in period t (i.e., years [−2,
−1] or [+1, +2]). ri,d,t is the daily stock return on day d in period t. VOLi,d,t is the (US) dollar trading volume
on day d in period t. The relative change in liquidity (ΔLIQUIDi) is deﬁned as ΔLIQUIDi ¼−1 ln ½ ILLIQi;½þ1;þ2ILLIQi;½−2;−1 .
We take logarithm to reduce skewness. This variable is only deﬁned for ﬁrms in the treatment countries (i.e.,
countries whose enforcement occurred within our sample period, 1982–2003). For observations in other
countries, ΔLIQUID is set to zero.
DataStream
SIZE Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Worldscope
MB Natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio, where the market-to-book ratio is deﬁned as the market value of
equity plus total assets minus the book value of total equity, divided by the book value of total assets.
Worldscope
Δcf Growth of operating cash ﬂows (cf), where cf. is deﬁned as the natural logarithm of one plus operating cash
ﬂow scaled by lagged total assets. Operating cash ﬂow is measured as income before extraordinary items
plus depreciation and amortization.
Worldscope
LEV Leverage, deﬁned as total debt scaled by the book value of total assets. Worldscope
WW The Whited and Wu (2006) index of ﬁnancial constraints. Worldscope
WEDGE Difference between the control rights and the cash ﬂow rights of the largest shareholder. Claessens et al. (2002); Faccio
and Lang (2002)
lnSALE Natural logarithm of total sales revenue. Worldscope
ROA Operating income scaled by the lagged book value of total assets. Worldscope
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